BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//132.216.98.100//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.20.4//
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:20250312T201525EDT-1133lmpv9l@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20250313T001525Z
DESCRIPTION:Legal Theory Workshop with Andrei Marmor\, Professor of Philoso
 phy and Maurice Jones Jr. Professor of Law\, USC Gould School of Law\, who
  will be discussing a paper he is currently working on.\nAndrei Marmor is 
 director of the USC Center for Law & Philosophy. He is editor-in-chief of 
 the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy\, an on-line peer-reviewed journ
 al in moral\, political and legal philosophy.\nA prolific author on issues
  concerning the relations between law morality and politics\, Professor Ma
 rmor has written Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press\
 , 1992\; Hart Publishing\, 2005)\; Positive Law & Objective Values (Oxford
  University Press 2001)\; Law in the Age of Pluralism (Oxford University P
 ress\, 2007)\;  Social Conventions (Princeton University Press\, 2009)\, P
 hilosophy of Law (Princeton\, 2011)\; and numerous journal articles.\nExce
 rpt\n'Observers of U.S. constitutional cases would have to admit that most
  of the important constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court are reache
 d on (so called) ideological grounds. The justices’ moral\, political\, so
 metimes even religious\, convictions tend to influence\, not to say determ
 ine\, the outcome of their decisions on constitutional matters\, though\, 
 of course\, rarely the public reasons given for them. The reasons are alwa
 ys cast in legal terms and phrased as legalistically as possible. But when
  we hear the outcome of constitutional cases\, we are very rarely surprise
 d. To the extent that an upcoming decision is not entirely predictable\, t
 he uncertainty is due to one swing vote – at most two – on the Court. I am
  not suggesting that this is always the case. Some decisions on constituti
 onal matters are not fraught with overt moral\, political or religious iss
 ues\, and sometimes it is difficult to trace the justices’ reasons to any 
 particular ideological convictions. But most of them are. [...]\nMy argume
 nt in this paper is not meant to provide an overall assessment of the argu
 ments for and against constitutional judicial review. It is only meant to 
 suggest that the counter-majoritarian rationale of CJR is seriously wantin
 g. The current system of CJR is fraught with arbitrary elements\, to an ex
 tent that makes the system only marginally better\, if at all\, compared w
 ith an overtly and blatantly randomized system.'\n
DTSTART:20150320T143000Z
DTEND:20150320T160000Z
LOCATION:Institute for Health and Social Policy seminar room \, Charles Mer
 edith House\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1A3\, 1130 avenue des Pins Ouest
SUMMARY:Legal Theory Workshop: Randomized Judicial Review
URL:/law/channels/event/legal-theory-workshop-randomiz
 ed-judicial-review-243384
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR