Rethinking the Charter鈥檚 鈥淚nterpretive鈥� Clauses: What Dickson means for Women鈥檚 Equal Rights

Sponsored by the 黑料不打烊 Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism,听 F.R. Scott Chair in Public & Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law Society, and the Feminist Legal Collective.

滨苍听Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation听(2024), the Supreme Court of Canada gave a robust interpretation of section 25 of the Charter, effectively shielding laws made by Indigenous self-governing communities from full scrutiny under section 15. This broad reading of section 25鈥檚 power came despite its explicit wording as an interpretive clause and its historically rare application by courts.

Section 28, which guarantees equal rights to male and female persons 鈥渘otwithstanding anything鈥� in the Charter and was once considered one of its most powerful provisions. Yet, like section 25, it has seen little judicial analysis. That is likely to change when the Supreme Court considers whether section 28 overrides the section 33 notwithstanding clause in the upcoming appeal of Quebec鈥檚 Law 21.

Professor Froc鈥檚 talk will explore the implications of听Dickson, how the decision reshapes our understanding of section 28, and what it means for the future of women鈥檚 equal rights under the Charter.

Bio

Kerri Froc is an Associate Professor at UNB Law and is currently the Law Foundation of Saskatchewan H. Robert Arscott Chair at the University of Saskatchewan College of Law.Dr. Froc writes on topics such as constitutional interpretation, access to justice, reproductive rights, women鈥檚 rights of political representation, and complex rights violations experienced by working women, poor women and racialized and Indigenous women.听 She is an expert on section 28 of the听Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms听and is a well-known media commentator on Canadian constitutional issues.

For more information, please write to Chrlp.law [at] mcgill.ca听